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Right of Publicity: Cardtoons, L. C. v. Major League
Baseball Players Association
L Introduction
In sum, it is unlikely that little leaguers will stop dreaming of the big
leagues or major leaguers will start 'dogging it' to first base if MLBPA
is denied the right to control the use of its members' identities in
parody.'
The right of publicity is a legal theory which permits each individual to control and
profit from the value of his or her name, likeness, image, or other aspects of identity
Approximately one-half of the states recognize this right either by statute or common
law? Oklahoma has one of the most expansive bodies of publicity law in the nation,
with two separate statutory enactments, and explicit recognition of the common law
right of publicity But, it was in Oklahoma that a small start-up company called
Cardtoons dared to challenge the Major League Baseball Players Association
(MLBPA) by printing parodies of active major league players. The Tenth Circuit held
that although Cardtoons violated the MLBPA's right of publicity under one of the
Oklahoma statutes, the First Amendment protected Cardtoons' trading card parodies
First, this note briefly relates the history of the right of publicity, the right as it
exists in Oklahoma, and discusses cases and developments which preceded the
Cardtoons decision. The second section of this note examines two district court
Cardtoons opinions and analyzes the Tenth Circuit's decision. Finally, this note
interprets the effect the Tenth Circuit opinion will have on the right of publicity and
its treatment in future court decisions.
IL Roots of the Right of Publicity
A. Early Years
The right of publicity is rooted in the more limited right of privacy, the right "to
be let alone."6 The right of privacy can be traced to a law review article7 written in
1890 by two young Boston law partners, Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis
1. Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 974 (10th Cir. 1996).
2. See Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 203, 215-17
(1954).
3. See J. Thomas McCarthy, The Human Persona as Commercial Property: The Right of Publicity,
19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTs 129, 132 (1995).
4. See Lucian W. Beavers, Oklahoma's Right of Publicity Laws, 57 OKLA. B.J. 2612,2612 (1986).
5. See Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 976.
6. McCarthy, supra note 3, at 134.
7. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
8. Almost 40 years later, Justice Louis D. Brandeis wrote that the framers of the Constitution
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Generally, the right of publicity differs from the right of privacy by protecting a
commercial rather than a personal interest.' Actions for infringement of the right of
publicity may involve the use of some aspect of the celebrity identity in adver-
tisements" or the use of the celebrity's" name, likeness, or identity on products or
merchandise. 2
In 1953, a federal judge coined the term "right of publicity" in Haelan Laboratories,
Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc. 3 Haelan, appropriately enough, involved two
chewing gum manufacturers in a dispute over the exclusive rights to use the image of
a major league baseball player to promote their respective products. Rejecting an
argument that the player only had a privacy right, a "personal and non-assignable right
not to have his feelings hurt by such a publication," 4 the court found that "a man has
a right in the publicity value of his photograph." 5 The court explained:
This right might be called a "right of publicity." For it is common
knowledge that many prominent persons (especially actors and ball-
players), far from having their feelings bruised through public exposure
of their likenesses, would feel sorely deprived if they no longer received
money for authorizing advertisements, popularizing their countenances,
displayed in newspapers, magazines, busses, trains and subways. This
right of publicity would usually yield them no money unless it could be
made the subject of an exclusive grant which barred any other advertiser
from using their pictures. 6
Recognition of the right of publicity has spread to many American jurisdictions
since 1953."7 The widespread acceptance of the right is largely attributable to an
"sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They
conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone - the most comprehensive of rights and
the right most valued by civilized men." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928).
9. See McCarthy, supra note 3, at 134.
10. See, e.g., Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988) (imitation of distinctive
voice); Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974) (replica of well-
known race car driver's car).
11. Any person can assert a right of publicity claim. However, most actions involve celebrities
because "there is little pecuniary gain in appropriating the name and likeness of an unknown individual."
Fred M. Weiler, Note, The Right of Publicity Gone Wrong: A Cave fir Privileged Appropriation of
Identity, 13 CARDOZA ARTs & EiNTr. L.J. 223, 224 n.8 (1994).
12. See, e.g., Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983) (portable
toilets); Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981) (pendants); Martin Luther King,
Jr., Ctr. For Soc. Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Prods., Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697 (Ga. 1982) (plastic
busts).








article 8 written by Melville Nimmer shortly after Haelan. Some form of the right of
publicity is now viable in twenty-five states. 9
The United States Supreme Court first acknowledged the existence of the right of
publicity in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.2' Zacchini brought an
action against a television station which aired his fifteen-second "human cannonball"
act in its entirety. The station had taped his act at a local fair without Zacchini's
permission. Zacchini claimed the station had appropriated his "professional
property.'"' An Ohio state court found that although Zacchini had a "right to the
publicity value of his performance,"' the First Amendment protected the station's
broadcast.' The United States Supreme Court reversed the Ohio court's decision,
holding that the First Amendment does not allow the media to appropriate a
performer's entire act, thereby threatening the economic value of the performance.24
B. The Right of Publicity in Oklahoma
Oklahoma has one of the most expansive bodies of publicity law in the nation.'
Oklahoma recognizes three separate causes of action for the wrongful appropriation
of an individual's identity: two statutory enactments" and a common law right of
publicity.' Oklahoma's privacy statute, enacted in 1965, prohibits the unconsented
use of a person's name or picture in advertising.' In 1986, Oklahoma enacted a
much broader publicity statute, which does not limit the control of an individual's
publicity right to advertising purposes.
C. The Climate Prior to Cardtoons
The right of publicity has expanded over the past forty years. Commentators have
argued that the decision in White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc.3" took "the
right of publicity to its farthest reach yet"'" and protest that the right has expanded
to the point of conflicting with the First Amendment.32
18. See Nimmer, supra note 2.
19. See McCarthy, supra note 3, at 132.
20. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
21. ld. at 564.
22. Id. at 565-66.
23. See id.
24. See id. at 575.
25. See Beavers, supra note 4, at 2612.
26. See 21 OKLA. STAT. §§ 839.1-839.3 (1991); 12 OKLA. STAT. §§ 1448-1449 (1991).
27. See McCormack v. Oklahoma Publ'g Co., 613 P.2d 737, 740 (Okla. 1980).
28. See 21 OKLA. STAT. § 839.1 (1991).
29. See 12 OKLA. STAT. § 1449 (1991).
30. 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992).
31. Stephen R. Barnett, First Amendment Limits on the Right of Publicity, 30 TORT & INs. L.J. 635,
638 (1995).
32. See id. at 637; Gretchen A. Pemberton, The Parodist's Claim to Fame: A Parody Exception to
the Right of Publicity, 27 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 97, 100 (1993); Douglas J. Ellis, Comment, The Right of
Publicity and the First Amendment: A Comment on Why Celebrity Parodies are Fair Game for Fair Use,
64 U. CIN. L. REV. 575, 579 (1996); Linda J. Stack, Note, White v. Samsung Electronics, Inc.'s
Expansion of the Right of Publicity: Enriching Celebrities at the Expense of Free Speech, 89 Nw. U. L.
1998]
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In 1992, Vanna White, the hostess of the game show "Wheel of Fortune," brought
a right of publicity action against Samsung, alleging that Samsung had used her
identity in a humorous magazine advertisement for video cassette recorders. The
advertisement featured a robot, dressed to resemble White, turning letters on a game
board. The caption read "Longest-running game show, 2012 A.D." The joke was that
Samsung recorders would still be around even after White had been replaced by a
robot. The Ninth Circuit found that White did not have a claim under California's
publicity statute because the statute only proscribed the commercial use of one's
"name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness,"33 and the robot was not White's
likeness.' The court did find, however, that Samsung's use was sufficient to "evoke"
White's identity, thus infringing on White's common-law right of publicity." White
subsequently recovered $403,000.'
When the Ninth Circuit denied a rehearing, Judge Kozinski, in his dissent,
unleashed unabashed criticism of the court's cursory dismissal of Samsung's First
Amendment claim: "The last thing we need, the last thing the First Amendment will
tolerate, is a law that lets public figures keep people from mocking them."37 Many
commentators agreed with Judge Kozinski, fearing that White foreclosed any future
commercial use of parody3
Then in 1994, the United State Supreme Court upheld the commercial use of parody
in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc." In Campbell, a rap music group parodied a
1960s rock ballad. The Court held that 2 Live Crew's "Pretty Woman" could be found
a fair use of Roy Orbison's "Oh, Pretty Woman."' Although Campbell is a copyright
infringement case, commentators eagerly awaited its application to the next right of
publicity action involving a parody' In pursuit of consistency, commentators long
had promoted the use of copyright's fair use doctrine 2 in right of publicity
REy. 1189, 1209 (1995).
33. White, 971 F.2d at 1397 (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a)).
34. See id
35. See id. at 1399.
36. See Vanna White Wins Suit Over Ad With Look-Alike Robot, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 21, 1994, at C13.
37. White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1519 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski,
J., dissenting).
38. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
39. 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
40. See icd at 594.
41. See, e.g., Ellis, supra note 32. At least one commentator, presuming the Tenth Circuit would
utilize fair use analysis, encouraged the court to refuse to distinguish between advertising and commercial
products in the court's analysis of the first prong. See Michael E. Hartmann & Daniel R. Kelly, Parody
(of Celebrities, in Advertising), Parity (Between Advertising and Other Types of Commercial Speech),
and (the Property Right o) Publicity, 17 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 633, 687 (1995).
42. The fair use doctrine sets forth four factors to be considered in determining whether a use of
copyrighted material qualifies as a "fair use," thus making the use permissible. This exception strives





analysis.43 Undoubtedly, many assumed that the Tenth Circuit would apply the
Supreme Court's fair use analysis to Cardtoons."
Over the years, numerous factors emerged which indicated that copyright's fair use
analysis would be the appropriate analytical vehicle for right of publicity cases. For
example, in Zacchini, the Supreme Court found that the state's interest in a right of
publicity action was analogous to its interest in a copyright or patent action.!5 In
addition, the Court found that the goals of the right of publicity were analogous to
those of the laws of copyright." The advantages of employing fair use analysis are
numerous. According to one proponent of its use:
By utilizing the copyright analogy in right of publicity decisions, courts
can inject uniformity and predictability into an area of law marred by
inconsistent and often conflicting determinations among sister states.
Because copyright is of constitutional origin, judges can draw upon an
extremely well-developed body of copyright case law to assist. their
resolution of publicity right issues. Moreover, because the policies
underlying both the right of publicity and copyright are similar, the
copyright analogy is especially apt.47
Although not all commentators agreed that fair use analysis was appropriate for
right of publicity cases,' 8 most endorsed some version of such analysis. 9 The highly
criticized White opinion, combined with the Supreme Court's application of the fair
use doctrine to a parody, seemed to set the stage for a court to embrace copyright's
fair use doctrine in a right of publicity case.
III. Cardtoons, L C. v. Major League Baseball Players Association
A. Facts
Cardtoons, L.C., a Tulsa-based company formed in late 1992, designed a series of
baseball trading cards that parodied active major league baseball players and teams.
The cards used recognizable caricatures, team colors, and names, so that anyone
familiar with the game would have little difficulty identifying the targeted players. The
43. See, e.g., Randall T.E. Coyne, Toward a Modified Fair Use Defense in Right of Publicity Cases,
29 WM. & MARY L. REv. 781, 782 (1988); H. Lee Hetherington, Direct Commercial Exploitation of
Identity: A New Age for the Right of Publicity, 17 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 1, 28-30 (1992).
44. Chief Judge Ellison applied the fair use doctrine and found that Cardtoons' trading cards were
indeed a fair use. See Cardtoons, L.C. v..Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 868 F. Supp. 1266, 1271-
75 (N.D. Okla. 1994) His 1994 decision was affirmed by the Tenth Circuit. See Cardtoons, L.C. v.
Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 974 (10th Cir. 1996).
45. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977).
46. See id.
47. Coyne, supra note 43, at 814.
48. See, e.g., Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Right of Publicity vs. The First Amendment: A Property
and Liability Rule Analysis, 70 IND. LJ. 47, 58 (1994) (arguing that the automatic invocation of the
copyright fair use analysis in cases presenting a conflict between First Amendment and right of publicity
is inappropriate).
49. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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cards poked fun at a variety of aspects of baseball, including the players' large
salaries," the players' large egos,' and the slow pace of the game.52 The MLBPA
serves as the exclusive collective bargaining agent for all active major league baseball
players." The MLBPA threatened Cardtoons with legal action if it marketed the
trading cards. Cardtoons responded by seeking a declaratory judgment in federal
district court to determine whether the parody baseball cards would infringe upon the
publicity rights of players represented by the MLBPA?
B. The Magistrate's Report: Cardtoons I
In 1993, a federal magistrate held that Cardtoons had improperly infringed upon the
publicity rights of the baseball players parodied in their cards.55 The magistrate first
found that Cardtoons' use of the players' identity was for a "purely commercial
purpose"' and in violation of Oklahoma's publicity statute," thus leading to the
question: "Is there a First Amendment 'parody' defense for a commercial product
under a balancing approach?"58 Finding no case in which a First Amendment parody
defense was successful to a right of publicity claim, the magistrate examined First
Amendment defenses under both trademarl and copyright law.6 The magistrate
found that First Amendment parody defenses are generally denied to commercial
uses.62 Finally, the magistrate balanced Cardtoons' use (commercial) and type of
medium (product) against the MLBPA's property rights and the ramifications of a
decision allowing Cardtoons' defense in this case.!3 The magistrate concluded that
50. One card featured San Francisco Giant Barry Bonds, who had just signed a six-year, $43.75
million contract at the end of the 1992 season. The card called him "Treasury Bonds" of the "Gents."
See Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 962-63 (10th Cir. 1996).
51. A card featured "Egotisticky Henderson" (Ricky Henderson) of the "Pathetics" (Oakland
Athletics) accepting the "Me-Me Award," saying: "I would just like to thank myself for all I have done.
(Pause for cheers.)" Id. at 963.
52. Another card featured "Cal Ripkenwinkle" (Baltimore Orioles' Cal Ripken). The card said "he
once fell asleep in the first inning and, when he awoke 20 years later, the game was still going. So he
proposed several rules to speed up play. Among them: Players may scratch themselves only between
innings." Robert Fachet, Baseball Doesn't See What's So Funny, WASH. POsT, July 9, 1993, at C2.
53. The cards included the following disclaimer "Cardtoons Baseball is a parody and is NOT
licensed by Major League Baseball Properties or Major League Baseball Players Association."
Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 962. Since 1966, the MLBPA has operated a group licensing program in which
it acts as the assignee of individual publicity rights for all active major league baseball players. It has
entered numerous licensing agreements fora variety of products, the most lucrative being baseball trading
cards which account for 70% of its licensing revenue. See id. at 963.
54. See Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 838 F. Supp. 1501 (N.D. Okla.
1993).
55. See id. at 1521.
56. Id. at 1515.
57. See id. at 1512.
58. Id. at 1515.
59. See id.
60. See id. at 1516-18.
61. See id. at 1518-19.
62. See id at 1519.




Cardtoons has a First Amendment right to parody baseball cards or players, but only
in a "non-commercial venue."' The district court adopted the magistrate's report and
entered a declaratory judgment for the MLBPA.'
C. Cardtoons I
Almost a year later, the district court set aside the above-described judgment,
finding for Cardtoons. M The district court decided to reconsider its earlier ruling so
that it could determine the effect of the Supreme Court's interim decision in Campbell
v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.'
The district court first employed the magistrate's three-part test to determine whether
Cardtoons had violated the Oklahoma statute.M The district court found that the
MLBPA had proved that Cardtoons: "(1) 'knowingly' used MLBPA's 'name' or
'likeness;' (2) on 'products, merchandise or goods;' (3) without MLBPA's prior
consent."'69 Once the MLBPA had proved each of the elements required by
Oklahoma's statute, held the district court, the burden shifted to Cardtoons to raise a
valid defense. 0 The district court then applied fair use analysis7' and found that the
trading cards constituted a "fair use."' Furthermore, the district court found that a
parody exception to Oklahoma's right of publicity statute was necessary to accom-
modate the First Amendment. 3
D. Cardtoons III
In August 1996, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment for
Cardtoons, but rejected the district court's fair use analysis." The Tenth Circuit
identified three steps necessary to the analysis of Cardtoons. First, the court would
need to determine whether the trading cards infringed upon the MLBPA's property
rights as established by Oklahoma's right of publicity statute.7 Second, if a violation
64. Id. at 1521.
65. See id. at 1503.
66. See Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 868 F. Supp. 1266, 1275 (N.D.
Okla. 1994).
67. 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (upholding parody Fst Amendment defense to a copyright infringement
claim).
68. See Cardtoons, 868 F. Supp. at 1269 (applying 12 OKLA. STAT. § 1449 (1985)).
69. 1d. (quoting Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Assn, 838 F. Supp. 1501, 1511
(N.D. Okla. 1993)).
70. See id.
71. The four fair use factors to be considered are: (1) the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of
the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work. See Cardtoons, 868 F. Supp. at 1271 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 107).
72. See id. at 1274.
73. See id. at 1275.
74. See Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 971 (10th Cir. 1996).
75. See il at 966.
76. See id. (citing 12 OKLA. STAT. § 1449(A) (Supp. 1985)). The Tenth Circuit also determined
whether the trading cards violated the MLBPA's rights under section 43(a)(1) of the Lanham Act, 15
1998]
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was found, the court would need to determine whether the First Amendment protected
the cards' Finally, if both Cardtoons and the MLBPA were determined to have
rights at stake, the court would need to balance the parties' respective rights."
1. Step One: Infringement of the Publicity Statute
The Tenth Circuit found that Cardtoons had violated the three elements of the
Oklahoma publicity statute.9 Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit found that the two
exceptions provided for in the statute offered "no haven for Cardtoons"; the cards
could not be characterized as either a "news" exception"l or an "incidental use"
exception.' Thus, finding that Cardtoons had infringed on the MLBPA's publicity
rights under the Oklahoma statute, the Tenth Circuit addressed the second step of its
analysis: Whether Cardtoons' parody baseball cards are protected by the First
Amendment.'
2. Step Two: Ascertaining the level of First Amendment Protection for the
Trading Cards
Resolving the second step of its analysis was not so easy for the court. The
necessity of determining the level of First Amendment protection of parody baseball
cards delivered the Tenth Circuit into a hazy stretch of law marked by few clear
landmarks or road signs. First, as a preliminary matter, the Tenth Circuit found that
the application of Oklahoma's statute was sufficient to satisfy the requirement that the
alleged encroachment on speech protected by the First Amendment has been made by
a government actor.' The Tenth Circuit was next faced with the task of charac-
terizing the type of speech to which the cards belonged, thus entering the murky
waters of "commercial speech" identification. Commercial speech is generally defined
as advertising or speech that does no more than propose a commercial transaction."
However, identifying commercial uses, or products sold for profit, can sometimes be
confusing. For example, the magistrate judge in the first Cardtoons opinion found that
the trading cards were not entitled to First Amendment protection because commercial
speech receives limited constitutional protection, and commercial speech that is a
product is entitled to even less protection.'
U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (1994). See Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 966-67. The possibility of a claim under the
Lanham Act provided the basis for the court's jurisdiction. See id. at 966. The court disposed of the
Lanham Act claim rather quickly, finding that the cards did not infringe on MLBPA's rights under the
Act because the cards did not create a likelihood of confusion. See id. at 967.
77. See id. at 966.
78. See id
79. See id at 968.
80. Id
81. See id at 968 (citing 12 OKLA. STAT. § 1449(D) (Supp. 1985)).
82. See id (citing 12 OKLA. STAT. § 1449(F) (Supp. 1985)).
83. See id
84. See id at 968-69 (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964)).
85. See Virginia State Bd. Of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
762 (1976) (citing Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1972)).




The Tenth Circuit, however, found that Cardtoons' parody trading cards were
entitled to full First Amendment protection because they were not commercial
speech." The Tenth Circuit held that the cards do not advertise another product,"
and the fact that the trading cards are sold for profit does not transform them into
commercial speech.' The Tenth Circuit found that the cards provide "social
commentary on public figures . . . who are involved in a significant commercial
enterprise."' Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit found-that the humorous aspect of the
cards makes them no less protected than if they had provided serious commentary.'
Specifically, the Tenth Circuit acknowledged that parody has long been recognized as
a literary device which provides valuable social commentary.' Furthermore,
"cartoons and caricatures, such as those in the trading cards, have played a prominent
role in public and political debate throughout our nation's history.'"3
The MLBPA had argued that Cardtoons should receive less First Amendment
protection because it "fail[ed] to use a traditional medium of expression."' The Tenth
Circuit, however, rejected this argument, finding that even untraditional media are
entitled to First Amendment protection."5 Several "untraditional forms of expres-
sion" have been recognized by the Supreme Court as deserving of First Amendment
protection, noted the Tenth Circuit, including "flag burning,"'9 "nude dancing,"" and
"wearing a jacket bearing the words 'Fuck the Draft."'"
The Tenth Circuit found that "even if less common mediums of expression were
to receive less First Amendment protection (perhaps out of concern for whether they
contain any expression at all), trading cards do not fall into that category."'" The
Tenth Circuit found that baseball trading cards have traditionally informed the public
about baseball players,"' providing an "education in baseball."'" Therefore, the
Tenth Circuit found that Cardtoons' trading cards are entitled to First Amendment
protection because they are an important form of expression."°
Okla. 1993) (citing Central Hudson v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980)).
87. See Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 970.
88. See id.
89. See id. (citing Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 761.
90. /d. at 969.
91. See id.
92. See id. (citing L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 28 (lst Cir. 1987)).




97. See id. (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989)).
98. See id. (citing Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981)).
99. See id. (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971)).
100. Id.
101. See id.
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3. Step Three: Balancing the MLBPA's Property Right Against Cardtoons' First
Amendment Right to Free Expression
Finally, the Tenth Circuit approached the task of balancing Cardtoons' free speech
rights with the MLBPA's property rights. The Tenth Circuit acknowledged that
copyright's fair use doctrine provided a First Amendment safeguard for copyright
cases."' The Tenth Circuit even cited Campbell as a recent Supreme Court decision
that applied the fair use doctrine to parody.' But then, without explanation, the
Tenth Circuit rejected the district court's application of the fair use doctrine to
Cardtoons, finding that "Oklahoma's right of publicity statute... does not provide a
similar accommodation for parody, and we must therefore confront the First
Amendment issue directly."'"
The Tenth Circuit examined the value of parody to society, finding that in order to
effectively criticize, parodists must use images and symbols that are familiar to
society."° Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit found that without First Amendment
protection, Oklahoma's statute would require Cardtoons to obtain permission to publish
its criticism." The Tenth Circuit found that this would "allow MLBPA to censor
criticism of its members"" and also would "have a chilling effect upon future
celebrity parodies.".. Therefore, the Tenth Circuit found that Cardtoons' right to free
speech "implicates some of the core concerns of the First Amendment."'
Next, the Tenth Circuit identified the consequences of infringing upon'the MLBPA's
right of publicity. The Tenth Circuit identified both economic and noneconomic
justifications for the right of publicity."' The economic arguments for the right of
publicity include the incentive it provides for "creativity and achievement,"". its
promotion of the "efficient allocation of resources,""4 and the protection the right of
publicity provides "against consumer deception."".5 The noneconomic justifications
for the right of publicity are that it "stem[s] from some notion of natural rights,""16
it allows "celebrities to enjoy the fruits of their labors,"".7 it prevents "unjust enrich-
ment,"". and it "prevents emotional injuries.""9 The Tenth Circuit then balanced
104. See id. at 970-71.
105. See id. at 971.
106. Id.
107. See id. at 972.
108. See id.
109. Id at 973.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 972.
112. See id. at 973.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 974.
115. Id. at 975.
116. Id.
117. Id.





Cardtoons' First Amendment right of free speech against these justifications for the
right of publicity."
The Tenth Circuit recognized that the economic arguments that support the right of
publicity are somewhat similar to the underlying policies of copyright and patent
law."' The Tenth Circuit found, however, that the economic incentive argument has
little application to celebrity parodies.'" The Tenth Circuit recognized that people
attain celebrity through diverse means including practice, natural talent, and luck.
The Tenth Circuit found that celebrities are usually well compensated and that unpaid
publicity, particularly parodic uses, would not discourage people to attain celebrity
status.
Finally, the Tenth Circuit found that the noneconomic justifications did not stand
up against Cardtoons' right of free expression." The Tenth Circuit found that these
noneconomic arguments were particularly tenuous in the context of celebrity parody
because the right of publicity would then be "reduced to the power to suppress
criticism.""j
The Tenth Circuit concluded that the application of Oklahoma's publicity statute to
Cardtoons' trading cards was a classic case of overprotection.'" The court found
little benefit in allowing the MLBPA control of the use of baseball players' identities
in parody trading cards." In addition, the court found that the cards are an
"important form of entertainment and social commentary that deserve First
Amendment protection.""
IV. The Legacy of Cardtoons
The Tenth Circuit's affirmation of the district court's decision is not surprising. The
only truly surprising aspect of its decision is the route the court took to get there. For
a decade, commentators have endorsed copyright fair use analysis in right of publicity
cases. '2 The district court wholeheartedly adopted such analysis in its Cardtoons
decision."' But the Tenth Circuit, with little explanation, rejected copyright fair use
analysis and chose instead to confront the First Amendment issues head-on.
The effect of the Tenth Circuit's decision on at least one segment of the trading card
market is clear: Cardtoons creates an exception in the right of publicity for trading
120. See id.
121. See id. at 973.
122. See id at 976.
123. See id. at 975-76.
124. See id. at 974.





130. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
131. See Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 868 F. Supp. 1266, 1271 (N.D.
Okla. 1994).
132. See Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 970-71.
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card parodists. One company began selling trading card parodies of National
Basketball Association (NBA) players in 1994.133 The NBA did not file an action
against that company, choosing to await the outcome of Cardtoons" Other sports
cards' parodists will surely join the market.
Another consequence, perhaps not considered by the Tenth Circuit, is much more
intriguing. The court may very well have opened the door for unlicensed manufacture
of all trading cards - even those of a more traditional ilk. In its attempt to avoid the
"commercial use" problem, the court made sweeping proclamations regarding all
baseball trading cards, not just parodic cards. With its proclamation that trading cards
are "an education in baseball"'35 and entitled to the level of First Amendment
protection granted to other traditional media, the court may have elevated baseball
cards to the same level of protection as is given books, magazines, and television
broadcasts. Prior to Cardtoons it was well established that traditional media could
publish stories about professional athletes, which include photographs and statistics."
If trading cards demand the same level of First Amendment protection as traditional
media - if they are in fact "education[s] in baseball"'" - then licenses may no longer
be required for any trading card publisher, even baseball card companies like Fleer,
Topps, and Upper Deck."
The commentators who hoped that the Tenth Circuit would carve out a parody First
Amendment defense to right of publicity cases for advertisers should be disap-
pointed.'39 The court explicitly found that the analysis would be different for
commercial speech." The court treated Cardtoons' trading cards as analytically
distinct from advertising or commercial speech.4 The court found that Cardtoons'
133. In October 1994, First Amendment Publishing, Inc. of New York (owned by Joseph Mauro)
began selling its trading cards, "Skinnies," which parody NBA players. See Joseph Mauro, Impact of
'Cardtoons' on Intellectual Property Law, N.Y.LJ., Feb. 10, 1995, at 7.
134. The Tenth Circuit granted First Amendment Publishing, Inc.'s motion for leave to file an
amicus curiae brief. See Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 976.
135. Id. at 969 (citing Fleer Corp. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 501 F. Supp. 485, 495-96 (E.D.
Pa. 1980)).
136. In the first Cardtoons, the magistrate judge suggests that "Cardtoons could parody the sport
(and its players) in a traditional forum such as a book or magazine," without infringing upon the
MLBPA's publicity rights. See Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 838 F. Supp.
1501, 1521 (N.D. Okla. 1993).
137. Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 969 (citing Fleer Corp. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 501 F. Supp. 485,
495-96 (E.D. Pa. 1980))
138. In 1993, the MLBPA authorized six companies to manufacture and sell trading cards depicting
its members: Topps, Fleer, Score, Upperdeck, Leaf/Donruss, and Pacific. The MLBPA also granted two
limited licenses that year. See Cardtoons, 838 F. Supp. at 1525. The baseball trading card business
generates an estimated $1.4 billion in annual sales. The six card companies pay royalties to the MLBPA,
which in turn distributes proportionate shares to its player members. See Spoqfing Baseball Caretv
Parodists Striking Out with Players, ARIz. REPUBUC (Phoenix), Sept. 4, 1995, at B6, available in 1995
WL 2825746.
139. See, e.g., Hartmann & Kelly, supra note 41, at 687.
140. "This efficiency argument is most persuasive in the context of advertising, where repeated use
of a celebrity's likeness to sell products may eventually diminish its commercial value." Cardtoons, 95
F.3d at 975.




parody trading cards, unlike advertising or commercial speech, were entitled to full
First Amendment protection.42
The Tenth Circuit dealt the largest disappointment to those commentators who
viewed Cardtoons as a ripe opportunity for a federal court to embrace fair use analysis
and thereby inject a greater consistency into right of publicity jurisprudence.43 The
Tenth Circuit analyzed both economic and noneconomic justifications for the right of
publicity." These justifications, however, were gleaned from several different
sources, with only two of the justifications coming from Supreme Court right of
publicity jurisprudence: the incentive for creativity and achievement, and the
avoidance of unjust enrichment. 45 Therefore, the Supreme Court could offer little
guidance in the Tenth Circuit's analysis of the case because many of the factors
considered came from a variety of sources" outside the Court.
The Supreme Court's recent application of fair use analysis to a parody47 could
have provided the Tenth Circuit with on-point guidance if the Tenth Circuit had
adopted fair use analysis in Cardtoons. The fair use doctrine employs the weighing
of four factors to determine if a use falls within the fair use exception." The factors
include:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of
a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the
nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the
effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.
149
These factors are not to be rigidly applied, and no single factor should be dispositive
of the issue. 5'
The district court had applied fair use analysis to Cardtoons, relying heavily upon
the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell.' The district court found that Cardtoons'
trading cards were a commercial use under the first guideline," the "purpose and
character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes."''" The court noted that in Campbell, the Supreme
Court found that a parody sold for profit is entitled to more First Amendment
142. See id.
143. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 112-26.
145. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977).
146. See, e.g., McCarthy, supra note 3.
147. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 572 (1994).
148. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
149. Id.
150. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577-78.
151. See Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 868 F. Supp, 1266, 1272 (N.D.
Okla. 1994).
152. See id. at 1272-73.
153. Id. at 1272 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1994)).
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protection than a parodic advertisement.'" Thus, the court found that Cardtoons'
parodies were a fair use under this guideline."5
The district court found that the second guideline, "the nature of the copyrighted
work," was inapplicable to this analysis because the nature of a likeness is factual, not
creative." The court noted that this factor is intended to provide greater protection
to creative works and less protection to works that are more informational or
functional.' Because the court may use its discretion in the use of these guidelines
or the consideration of any additional factors, the district court discounted this
guideline from its analysis."
The third guideline is "the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation
to the copyrighted work as a whole."" In a parody context, this guideline's goal is
to ascertain whether more of the original was taken than necessary to achieve a
successful parody. Cardtoons used caricatures rather than photographs of the players.
The district court found that Cardtoons could have accomplished its purpose with a
more extensive use of the "original" by using photographs, but could not have
succeeded with anything less.t" Therefore, the court found that the third factor
weighed in favor of fair use.'6'
Finally, the fourth guideline is "the effect of the use upon the potential market for
or value of the copyrighted work."'" This factor is the most important consideration
of fair use analysis." The district court identified the principal query as whether the
sale of Cardtoons' parodic trading cards would usurp the market for traditional cards.
The court found this unlikely primarily because of the differences between the two
types of cards.'" Traditional cards use photographs and statistical data; Cardtoons'
cards use cartoons and irrelevant commentary." The court found that the parody
cards are not a "substitute product" for traditional cards even though some people may
indeed buy both types of cards." Therefore, the court concluded that this guideline
also weighed in favor of fair use.67
The district court thus found that three of the fair use guidelines weighed in favor
of finding that Cardtoons' trading cards were a fair use of the players' likenesses, and
one guideline was inapplicable to the right of publicity.'" The Tenth Circuit refused,
154. See id. at 1273.
155. See id. at 1272-73.
156. See id. at 1273 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (1994))
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (1994).
160. See Cardtoons, 868 F. Supp. at 1273-74.
161. See id. at 1274.
162. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1994).
163. See Cardtoons, 868 F. Supp. at 1274 (citing Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 437 (9th Cir. 1986)









however, to utilize the district court's fair use analysis despite the seemingly perfect
timing and the widespread support of its application to the right of publicity.
It seemed that without question, Cardtoons was the perfect publicity case for the
application of fair use analysis for three reasons. First, it followed so closely behind
the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell. Second, the claimed infringement in both
cases was a commercial product. In Campbell, the product was a popular song; in
Cardtoons, the product was trading cards. Finally, and particularly significant, was the
fact that both products were parodies of the originals.
Certainly the district court had recognized the applicability of the Campbell analysis
to Cardtoons. The court had cited the Campbell decision as its primary reason for
rejecting the earlier magistrate's decision. The district court effectively applied the
Supreme Court's fair use analysis to Cardtoons. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district
court's decision, but rejected the district court's fair use analysis. In doing so, the
Tenth Circuit left publicity jurisprudence in the same confused state in which the court
found it.
V. Conclusion
The Tenth Circuit carved out a First Amendment exception to Oklahoma's right of
publicity statute. This exception will clearly protect parodies used in non-commercial
speech. Non-parodic speech, and even advertising parodies, will have to fight their
own battle to claim First Amendment protection in right of publicity actions. Courts
that decide future right of publicity cases will have to choose the type of analysis that
seems appropriate in each case. Courts may follow the Tenth Circuit and identify the
underlying justification for one party's right of publicity and balance that against the
cost of infringing upon the opposing party's First Amendment rights of free
expression. Or, perhaps, some court in the future will apply the well-developed fair
use doctrine to right of publicity cases.
It is possible that a trading card company may interpret the Tenth Circuit's opinion
as a green light to publish unlicensed trading cards, regardless of whether the cards
are parodic in nature. The Tenth Circuit's proclamation that trading cards are "an
education in baseball" and, therefore, entitled to the same First Amendment protection
as traditional media, may have raised trading cards to the protection level enjoyed by
books, magazines, and television broadcasts. The district court had avoided this
construction in its fair use analysis. Although this construction was surely not intended
by the Tenth Circuit, it could provide support to a trading card publisher looking to
increase its bottom line by avoiding the expense of licensing.
Finally, no one is trying to promote a bright line test for right of publicity cases.
Like in copyright, the respective interests of the parties must be balanced. But
balancing tests can sometimes deteriorate into juggling acts, and a clear description of
the preliminary factors to be weighed would provide the desired consistency necessary
for courts to avoid calamity.
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